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Models of uneven spatial development  
 
Studies and models bringing spatial polarisation into the focus of economic studies 
entered the mainstream of regional research in the 1950s. The school of thought associated 
with  Gunnar  Myrdal  (1957)  asserts  that  spatial  inequalities  persist  and  differences  grow 
through imbalances that exist between the individual regions already at the outset, cumulative 
impacts, causal chains and the persistence of spread and backwash effects. Paul Krugman 
(1991), the father of the so-called new economic geography also belongs to this school of 
thought. His theory means a step forward relative to Myrdal’s, as it provides an explanation 
for the emergence of and increase in spatial inequalities as well as the evolvement of a special 
regional economic character even when there are only low level initial differences. It attaches 
critical importance to the role of agglomeration economy and is able to tackle the impact of 
state  economic  policy.  The  downside  to  the  model  is  that  it  rules  out  technological 
externalities,  ignores  innovations  and  provides  only  a  sketchy  outline  of  the  process  of 
economic growth. 
In  contrast,  another  group  of  researchers  (Rostow,  1960;  Friedmann,  1973; 
Richardson, 1980) claim that those significant regional differences which arise as a result of 
the adoption of the capitalist mode of production become less marked as mass production and 
welfare become common, and that regions, deeply embedded in national economies and on a 
more or less similar level of development, emerge. The main underlying idea of the models is 
the continuous presence of those spread effects that first facilitate the evolvement of strong 
economic agglomerations, and then play a key role in the creation of spatial cohesion and 
equalisation. 
While  advocates  of  the  above  models  argue  that  spatial  equalisation  materialises 
through  the  spontaneous  movement  of  market  forces,  economic  experts  in  favour  of  the 
theory  of  growth  poles  (Perroux,  1955;  Paelinck,  1965;  Pottier,  1963;  Boudeville,  1966; 
Lasuén, 1969) are unified in their opinion that an active government policy is crucial. They 
claim that sectoral growth poles can emerge even in economically disadvantaged regions, and 
add  that  the  development  of  wider  regions  can  be  stimulated  by  the  impact  of  regional 
multiplicators.  Analysing  the  examples  of  developing  countries,  Lasuén  (1973),  however, 
points out the role of artificial growth poles in the emergence of a dual economic structure 
and a disproportionate spatial structure that becomes fossilised in the long run. What critics of 
the theory of growth poles contest is not this, but rather the strength of the development link 
between growth poles and their ‘hinterland’ as well as the actual effect mechanism of an 
incubated core of development. The identification of the flaws in the theory encouraged the 
formulation of the theory of innovation-oriented development, on the one hand, and that of 
endogenous development, on the other. Although development concepts
1 based on the theory 
                                                  
1 They found their purest form in the National Regional Development Concept (1999). of growth poles crept in regional policies in Hungary in the 1990s, their implementation was, 
however, only partial due to scarcity of capital. 
The  innovation-oriented  school  of  thought  embraces  Schumpeter’s  propositions 
(1980); however, it  also goes further  and addresses the issues of a systemic approach  to 
innovations (Edquist, 1997), an evolutionist approach to the national systems of innovation 
(Nelson, 1982) as well as the possibilities and limitations of interactive learning processes 
(Lundvall, 1992). For the purposes of this paper the importance of the neo-Schumpeterian 
school of thought lies in the fact that it can identify the regional systems of innovation that 
coexist  with  a  global  system  of  innovations,  from  which  it  can  interfer  geographical 
specialisation on a regional scale.  
Models  of  development  based  on  internal  resources  underwent  significant 
development between the 1970s and 1990s. While initial theories hoped for almost automatic 
development and convergence through the enhanced exploitation of internal resources and the 
novel  combinations  of  their  utilisation,  the  past  decade  has  been  characterised  by  a  new 
perception of technological knowledge and an unambiguous abandonment of neo-classical 
theories. According to Romer’s interpretation, (1994) the spatial distribution of knowledge 
(including its hidden components) is uneven, the possibility of its spatial transfer is limited 
and an exchange of expertise and experience personally is of key importance. The emergence 
and persistence of spatial inequalities in an imperfect competition is inevitable. However, as 
basis innovations change, so some places and regions, through rapidly activating the hidden 
components of knowledge, may be successful also over a longer term, while others may lose 
their  existing  competitive  edge,  believed  to  be  long-term  earlier,  under  a  new  economic 
paradigm.  
Centre–periphery models seek to describe the system of spatial differences on a global 
economic  scale.  While  Wallerstein  (1974)  uses  a  dual  model  that  provides  an  academic 
abstraction of the evolvement of the modern global economic system in order to present the 
trends under review, spatial research made its mark by modelling dependence at a whole-
economy (Friedmann, 1966) and settlement level (Haggett, 1983) as well as flow-induced 
dependence (Dicken, 1992). The last type adopts a novel approach to how spatial differences 
become  entrenched,  while  not  ruling  out  the  simultaneous  emergence  of  trends  towards 
concentration and deconcentration (decentralisation). Under this approach, regional networks 
are  instrumental  in  the  creation  of  a  complex  spatial  structure  and  geographical 
differentiation.  Another  key  components  are  urban  regions,  particularly  the  classic  core 
regions. 
The globalisation theories of the 1990s also help to acquire a better understanding of 
current trends in Hungary. Scott’s theory on regions that are engines of economic growth and 
their ‘hinterland’ which are capable of progress (1988) can be applied to the European Union 
and Hungary relatively closely. Hamilton’s interpretation of globalisation (1999), according 
to which, ‘… [it is] a series of processes that provide a forum for key participants’ securing 
their interests and for the implementation of their ideas about space’, helps to understand the 
behaviour of foreign capital in a Hungarian context. This interpretation is further expounded 
by Dicken (1992), who discusses changes in the priorities of corporate strategy building and 
more  specifically  the  optimal  scheme  of  corporate  governance  adopted  by  multinational 
companies
2. Knox and Agnew (1998) make it clear that there is a tough spatial competition 
for investment funds, in which the competitiveness of regions (i.e. areas and settlements) must 
be proved continuously. 
Porter’s theory on competitive development as a theory on regional competitiveness 
(1996) combines the main findings of the theories on agglomeration economies, growth poles 
                                                  
2 In analysing motives for FDI, Dunning’s eclectic theory (1988) offers similar conclusions. and economic bases. The basic unit of his model is the regional economic cluster with low 
transaction costs, high synergies and mostly outstanding development determinants. However, 
it  does  not  interpret  the  development  outlook  for  regions  that  have  no  or  hardly  any 
development determinants, are only loosely connected to global competition and struggling 
technologically.  It  offers  continuous  productivity  growth  as  its  fit-for-all  panacea,  which 
presupposes  that  manufacturing  tradables  are  produced  for  export  in  a  high  employment 
environment.
3 
Our hypothesis was: the 15-year-long period of regime change development of the 
Hungarian  economy  was  fundamentally  determined  by  a  steady  rapid  increase  in  spatial 
differences and, hence, growing inequalities between the individual settlements and regions. 
 
Spatial inequalities at the time of the regime change  
 
The fundamental characteristics of state socialist economic control were the mitigation 
of inequalities on the regional (primarily county-) level and spatial equalisation. Consistent 
with the ideological system of the regime, this was implemented mainly through the centrally 
controlled  location  of  industries,  initially  (between  1965  and  1975)  as  a  result  of  direct 
government  decisions
4,  later  (i.e.  after  1975)  indirectly,  through  allowing  for  the  spatial 
preferences of state-owned large industrial companies. 
This led to significant reduction in spatial inequalities on the regional levels under 
review  (i.e.  planning/economic  regions  and  even  more  importantly  counties)  and  in  the 
dimensions under review (i.e. fixed investment developments, output indicators, fixed assets, 
income and employment). However, a number of insidious trends also emerged which later 
added  to  spatial  inequalities.  One  was  that  marked  disindustrialisation
5  led  to  the  post-
industrial  development  of  Budapest
6,  which  proved  to  be  a  structural  advantage  over  the 
countryside  after  the  regime  change.  Another  was  that  an  industrial  belt  (the  so-called 
industrial  axis)  stretching  in  a  North  Easterly–South  Westerly  direction  inside  Hungary, 
which was the primary destination of industrial fixed investment
7. (Figure 1) 
Key economic actors in the rest of the country included, almost invariably, industrial 
sectors satisfying local needs, labour intensive manufacturing sectors (food and light industry, 
especially, textile and clothes industry employing unskilled female labour) and local branches 
of large companies. Such local branches were a typical form of large socialist companies. 
Relying on one single resource, i.e. available labour trained to perform one single task in the 
production process, they were, in fact, the local units of production of large companies in 
                                                  
3 Since the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1970s, a new paradigm in geography arised which reject spatial models due to 
their  mechanical  nature  and  formalism.  It  is  new  social  geographical  streams  (i.e.  behaviourial  approach, 
humanistic and radical geography) that criticise these models the most adamantly. Their most frequent objection 
to them is that they ignore real space and the scale of spatial processes. (Martin, 1999) 
4 Although MSZMP KB (the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) passed a resolution 
on the industrialisation of the countryside in as early as 1958, its implementation only began in the mid-1960s.  
5 In the mid-1950s, despite the first massive wave of construction of large industrial centres, the share of the 
capital city in industrial wage earners still exceeded 40%, while its population accounted for a mere 19% of the 
country’s population. When the process came to an end in the early 1980s, corresponding figures were 28%, and 
20% respectively. 
6 It is safe to say that the early 1980s saw the beginning of a process in which the development of the dynamic 
space of the capital city and that of the provinces ran separate courses. The former was boosted by the services 
sector, the latter by the prevailing engines of growth in manufacturing. 
7 As increase in the volume of housing construction and the development of institutional and infrastructural 
networks and welfare systems were closely linked up to industrial fixed investment projects at the time, securing 
a high-profile government-funded investment project provided an excellent opportunity for the development of 
the settlement concerned and its region. economically  backward  (or,  according  to  the  prevailing  system  of  values,  under-
industrialised) regions of the country. Neither qualified management, nor an efficient and 
experienced administrative staff was available at these branches. Nor were any powers of 
decision-making delegated to them. After the regime change large state-owned companies 
divested these branches, the majority of them were unable to survive under market economy 
conditions. By contrast, core-companies managed to remain in business through considerable 
sacrifices. 
Settlement-owned  businesses  and  non-agricultural  arms  of  co-operatives  were 
established to employ permanently or seasonally available labour in local economies. The 
former were set up to implement the development-related tasks of local councils. Most were 
able grow under  quasi-market  circumstances prior  to the regime change.  Later  they  were 
privatised predominantly by resident private individuals. Some economists seemed to identify 
a nascent hinterland industry in this group of viable businesses. Illusions were shattered by the 
regime change.  
The majority of former self-employed craftsmen had to work in cottage industry and 
small industrial co-operatives. Evoking the model of the Third Italy, the successful ones are 
still in business, producing specialised high quality commodities. Those that proved unfit for 
long-term operation either went out of business or their employees became self-employed 
again (or formed minor business partnerships). 
As was pointed out by economists and regionalists at the time, the snare laid by what 
looked  equalisation was that equalisation  came at a price, i.e. spatial inequalities became 
increasingly  sharp  in  the  individual  counties  (regions).  Gábor  Vági  (1982)  outlined  how 
development funds had been allocated within the individual counties. The development of 
county seats was accorded the highest priority. In the case of villages, which constituted the 
bulk of the settlement stock, however, budgetary funds slowed to a trickle. The reason why it 
engendered  general  social  tension  was  that  from  the  1970s  booming  large  agricultural 
companies contributed to development in villages heavily and ran a verifiable welfare system. 
Household plot production on the pieces of land allotted to members of the co-operatives was 
a source of supplementary income, which also resulted in tangible improvement in living 
standards, through a significant amount of extra work, though. 
The radical left-wing of MSZMP, which considered the class of organised industrial 
workers and, within this, skilled workers to be the backbone of the party, detected agriculture-
fuelled rural convergence, and urged immediate steps. As one of its last realistic measures, the 
‘Kádár regime’
8, while remaining in favour of growing wealth in the provinces, allowed for 
the possibility that labour in large industry could also earn supplementary income. Its tool for 
this was economic teams, which it first supported, then, in 1982, officially approved. This 
change led to the incorporation of the principle of productivity and the possibility of financial 
reward for individual performance in the system. In the 1980s the development of small-scale 
businesses rested on the social capital and trust
9. The rapid spread of quasi-private enterprises 
and, after 1984, private companies proper (e.g. economic associations, civil law companies, 
co-operatives  etc.)  foreshadowed  the  emergence  of  a  new  divide  in  the  country’s  spatial 
structure  along  a  new  dimension.  (Nemes  Nagy,  Ruttkay,  1989)  Subsequent  studies 
(Rechnitzer, 1993) also attest to a similar spatial divide in entrepreneurial activity, which ran 
in a West-Easterly direction, while activity in large centres was outstanding. 
However,  the  emergence  of  predominantly  small  business  units  was  only  one 
spectacular, but not the most efficient factor that shaped the new economic spatial structure 
                                                  
8 János Kádár was the leader of the communist party from 1957 to 1987. 
9  The  existence  of  a  ‘second  economy’  was  instrumental  in  transition  into  market  economy  and  in  the 
establishment of enterprises. that evolved after the regime change. The two key processes were privatisation and greenfield 
investments, as the amount of capital that was involved in them (especially in the former) was 
far  greater  than  what  was  involved  during  the  enterprise  boom.  The  transformation  and 
privatisation of former state-owned (settlement-owned) companies did not have a significant 
direct impact on spatial structure in the first phase, as there was a change only in the owners 
of existing production capacity. However, the timing of privatisation, the sectors involved, the 
type  of  owners  vested  with  decision-making  powers,  the  corporate  strategies  on  which 
developments were based and the results of these strategies did matter. Thus, in the case of 
privatisation it was quality components that were key to corporate level success and ability to 
adjust as well as, from a broader perspective, development prospects for entire settlements 
and regions. 
In the case of privatisation it was existing supply that motivated investors. By contrast, 
greenfield  investments  were  influenced  by  the  market,  logistical  positions,  accessibility, 
existing  professional  culture  and  the  tradition  of  co-operation,  depending  on  investors’ 
objectives.  As  regards  privatisation,  spatial  inequalities  of  supply  and  the  end  of  the 
privatisation process strengthened the economic position of the capital city and its wider space 
and that of Northern Transdanubian counties. However, the real cause of a dramatic increase 
in spatial inequalities was the regional distribution of greenfield investments. The regions 
which investors prioritised were practically identical to the space referred to in connection 
with  privatisation,  except  that  greenfield  investments  targeted  rural  space,  the  Austro-
Hungarian border zone, the Vienna-Budapest axis and the capital city’s wider agglomeration 
space. (Figure 2) 
Inequalities in the spatial distribution of enterprises, privatisation and even greenfield 
investments alone would not have led to such sharp spatial differences that they actually did 
had they not been coupled with the crisis and phase-out of sectors which were the engines of 
growth  in  those  regions  that  were  less  prioritised  by  capital.  A  lopsided  industry  with  a 
wasteful pattern of raw material and energy consumption in former industrialised regions and 
regional  economic  models  based  on  large-scale  agrarian  production  as  well  as  related 
manufacturing  and  light  industry  faced  crisis.  Neither  privatisation,  nor  greenfield 
investments (which, although they did emerge isolated, had no material catalytic impact) were 
able to help the regions concerned overcome it until the final years of 1990s. Increasingly 
strong  separation  between  crisis  and  dynamic  spaces  engendered  inequalities  across  the 
country, which in turn transformed the pre-regime change spatial structure profoundly and 
contributed to the entrenchment of internal division. (Figure 2) 
Market forces during the stages of development that followed the regime change – 
crisis,  economic  downturns,  consolidation  with  time  lags  and  spatial  delays  and  rapid 
economic growth followed by more lacklustre growth after the turn of the millennium – added 
to  regional  inequalities.  This  dichotomy  was  clearly  reflected  in  inequalities  between  the 
capital city and the provinces, those within rural areas and in the level of development of the 
constituents of the settlement network. Experience confirms that spontaneous forces in the 
Hungarian  market  economy,  which,  in  essence,  operate  along  neo-liberal  principles, 
undoubtedly generate inequalities and division rather than integrate regions with different 
potential and relative advantages. 
The  state  development  policy  of  the  time  also  adopted  neo-liberal  principles, 
prioritising the sectoral approach over the regional one. This approach focused mainly on 
improving the competitiveness of the country as a whole, setting a pace of economic growth 
exceeding EU average and narrowing the productivity gap. It addressed social and regional 
tensions arising from, among other things, job losses, a lack of investments and less attractive 
investment opportunities through case-by-case interventions on the wrong scale. What further exacerbated the situation was that the state itself as a key investor
10 contributed to spatial 
inequalities significantly
11. 
Regional  development  and  spatial  planning,  for  which  a  legal  background  was 
provided in 1996, was hardly able to finance material developments or materially influence 
the  development  trajectories  of  the  individual  regions  for  lack  of  funds.  Contrary  to 
appearances (the number of tenders submitted, that of successful tenders and the amount of 
the funds granted), the Széchenyi Plan, initiated by the Orbán government in 2000, added to 
an already large number of differences between the individual regional units and settlements 
through its projects directly associated with the economy. 
Although it is still early days to assess the impacts of the National Development Plan 
for 2004-2006 (some of the tender opportunities have not even opened up and the majority of 
the  tender procedures have not  been  completed  yet), the subjects of  the  calls for tenders 
reflect the survival of an earlier logic. This is hardly likely to be conducive to more even 
spatial  development  through  the  involvement  of  EU  funds  (more  specifically  Structural 
Funds). The current position of the central budget offers limited leeway  for development 
projects financed through the involvement of domestic funds. Raising funds for national co-
financing in order  to secure EU  funds  puts financial stress on  the  individual  government 
agencies.  Given  the  circumstances,  it  is  sheer  naivety  to  expect  sectors  to  adopt  a 
development policy that accords priority to the principle of regionality, and this is hardly 
affected by the fact that, compared to earlier years, regions, key units of area development, 
can dispose over a larger volume of funds of their own. (92% of the funds transferred by the 
central government are dedicated funds rather than all-purpose ones and serve sectoral rather 
than regional interests.) 
Spatial developments in economic indicators and changes in income positions move in 
parallel. That the proportion of wage earners is higher, that of the unemployed is lower and 
labour  is  better  paid  in  dynamic  regions  are  not  the  only  explanations.  Material  spatial 
inequalities  are  also  discernible  between  more  affluent  and  less  well-off  regions  and 
settlements even in the case of the public sector, frequently criticised for its size, where, in 
principle, spatial inequalities are equalised. Differences on a similar scale are also detectable 
in the pension scheme. A slope running in a West-Easterly direction, though less steep than 
the  one in the private  sector, is also present in  sectors under government  control.  Lower 
income is not coupled with lower costs of living. The financial value of the key components 
of  wealth  (i.e.  land  and  housing  property)  held  by  families  in  lagging  regions  is  a  mere 
fraction of their counterparts in dynamic regions, which dampens willingness to move from 
stagnating or lagging areas to those perceived as successful. 
The era of the regime change was, without a doubt, that of spatial differentiation in 
Hungary, and with a decade and a half having passed, it proved right the spatial models that 
expected  moderate  initial  differences  to  grow  into  marked  regional  differentiation  and 
projected the persistence of such differences. 
 
Model calculations: a tool for interpreting spatial structure 
 
Potential  models  included  in  the  category  of  spatial  models  based  on  physical 
analogies are hardly used by geographers, demographers or economists in Hungary. These 
models emerged in international literature as part of what is called quantitative revolution 
                                                  
10 Central government investments accounted for 20%-25% of the total volume of fixed capital investment, in 
contrast to the weight of economic participants, which represented nearly two-thirds. 
11 Calculations attest that the contribution of the central government to spatial inequalities amounted to 17%-
18% in the 1990s. (Stewart,  1948).  Although  there  have  been  a  few  pioneering  studies  seeking  to  define 
demographic  and  transport  potential,  subsequent  investigations  have  been  far  and  few 
between.  A  summary  of  geographic  approaches  has  been  provided  by  Hayes  and 
Fortheringham (1988) in the Anglo-Saxon literature and by József Nemes Nagy (1984, 1998) 
in its Hungarian counterpart. 
 
Compilation of data bases, the formula employed and corrections  
The database used for regional-level model calculations was based on a European spatial 
structure where the European Union was made up of 15 member states and the rest of Europe 
comprised of nation states. Our first model treated the EU as an economic unit where the role 
of borders was negligible, but that of the EU’s outer boundaries in filtering economic effects 
was of key importance. As regards the second model, our main concern was that economic 
policy decisions at the national level were still dominant in the EU. Hence, we decided to 
carry out a study at the national level. In order to make model calculations straightforward we 
chose not to distinguish national borders. We assumed that borders ensured a flow of goods, 
people  and  information  with  equal  intensity  −  in  other  words  their  filtering  effects  were 
practically the same. Our basic assumption was that more borders reduced the efficiency of 
interaction between two neighbouring economies in a roughly linear fashion. 
The selection of attraction centres made the model even more straightforward. Capital cities 
were given the role of such centres, no matter how far they were from the actual economic 
centres. For EU member states, this posed a problem only on one occasion (that for Germany 
and Berlin). As for non-EU member states, Slovakia and Croatia faced the same problem. 
Given the current state of affairs, however, we could not do anything else. 
The  software  (Michelin’s  European  Route  Planner)  used  to  define  distances  offered  two 
possible approaches to interpreting distance. One was distance expressed in kilometres, the 
other was the time needed for the journey. As this software provided data on the basis of the 
2004 road network, the first approach seemed to carry a lower risk of marked bias since, as a 
result  of  thoroughfare  improvements,  the  average  journey  time  (i.e.  journey  time  per 
kilometre) had changed significantly almost everywhere. Unfortunately, we could not use an 
older version of the software in making our calculations, which would have reflected the 2001 
state of road networks. 
 
In calculating the potential, we used the following formula: 
 
Pi = Gi/dii + Σ(Gj/dij)  (j=1,…n; j≠i), where 
Pi is the economic potential of the spatial unit i, 
Gi/dii denotes the ‘internal’ economic potential, 
Σ(Gj/dij)  (j=1,…n; j≠i) is  the ‘external’ economic potential, where 
Gi and Gj represent the economic weight of the spatial units i and j respectively,  
dii is the estimated intra-regional distance calculated in the following manner: dii 
= (Ti/Π)
0,5/3, where 
Ti represent the size of the spatial unit (counties and regions) under review, 
dij denotes the distance between the spatial units i and j. 
As  a  result  of  the  calculations,  regional  and  county-level  shifts  and  the  extent  of 
changes could be identified. Thus, a fundamentally static model was dynamised, which in turn 
allowed for fuller utilisation. 
 Results of model calculations  
While devising the model calculations, we adopted the hierarchy that followed from the logic 
of the formula. As a first step, we calculated the inner potential of the Hungarian regions 
(Table 1). In order to be able to do so, we generated regional GDP data in EUR billion as well 
as an inferred internal distance. The latter automatically lowers the value of large regions with 
smaller economic power, while it highlights high regional GDP generated by relatively small 
areas among competing areas. Assuming that the economic potential of the capital city is 100, 
the relative potential of the two regions taking the lead in economic restructuring (successful 
re-industrialisation) is within the 18.2%–18.5% range, while that of lagging regions varied 
between 11.5% and 14.5%
12. 
As a second step, the interaction between the Hungarian regions (Figure 3.) was assessed. 
Except for the region that also includes Budapest, the economic potential ‘received’ from 
other Hungarian regions exceeded the amount of inner potential. As regards the metropolitan 
region, the contribution of the other large Hungarian regions hardly exceeded 15%, which 
means  that  the  development  of  the  capital  city  and  its  economic  ‘hinterland’  is  largely 
independent of the processes that occur in the other regions of the country. However, in the 
reverse case, i.e. in the case of the countryside, (due to the outstanding economic weight and 
central status of Budapest and its region) the degree of dependence is much stronger. When 
the relative economic potential of the other regions is compared to that of the metropolitan 
one,  a  clear  shift  can  be  detected,  relative  to  the  previous  step.  Through  the  economic 
impulses that arrive predominantly from the central region, there was a considerable rise in 
the value of the relative potential (the Budapest region continues to be represented by 100 
units). It was twice the original value even for that of lagging regions.
13 Of the two success 
regions in the provinces, the relative potential in Western Transdanubia, which is further away 
from Budapest, is a good 10% lower than in Central Transdanubia, which is unequivocally 
attributable  to  its  relatively  peripheral  location.  Even  so,  ‘home  potential’  in  Western 
Transdanubia is 7.5% higher than that of the region immediately following it. This suggests 
that the development position of the region is  relatively favourable even within the tight 
framework of the national economy. 
The  third  step  was  the  measurement  of  the  impact  exerted  by  the  neighbouring  national 
economies on the Hungarian regions in accordance with the above two model variants. In 
order that the manageability of calculations could be ensured, effects scoring lower than 10
14 
were considered as marginal and excluded from further calculations. In the variant where the 
European Union was treated as a single economic space, the inner potential of the Hungarian 
regions, except for Budapest, of which the share was 40%, always remained below 10%, 
while the so-called ‘home potential’
15 varied between 17% and 27% (it rose to 45% in the 
metropolitan region). These low values point to the openness of the Hungarian economy and 
its heavy reliance on external relationships. It follows from the nature of the model that the 
regions in the west receive a higher supplementary potential than do those on the eastern 
peripheries, as in Europe’s spatial structure it is in the western hemisphere of the Continent 
that GDP values are high. 
 
 
                                                  
12 Southern Transdanubia has the lowest values, while the Northern Great Plain has somewhat higher values. 
13 Southern Transdanubia continues to bring up the rear. The potential in Northern Hungary turned out to be 
somewhat higher in the group. 
14 It denotes a value pegged to Budapest that, in theory, allows other nearby regional centres to have impact 
scores that reach or even exceed 10. In practice, however, this has never been the case. 
15 Home potential denotes the value of potential measured in the Hungarian economy. This is the sum total of the 
regions’ inner potential and the development potential received from other regions. Table 1.a  The economic potential* of Hungarian regions, 2001     
           
  Inner potential  National potential  National potential  Outer potential  Potential 
Regions  Gi/dii   from outer regions  sum.  from foreign countries  overall 
Central Hungary  3,414  0,521  3,935  3,366  7,301 
Central Transdanubia  0,630  1,168  1,798  3,566  5,364 
West Transdanubia  0,624  0,723  1,347  4,247  5,594 
South Transdanubia  0,402  0,530  0,932  3,089  4,021 
North Hungary  0,468  0,584  1,052  3,017  4,069 
North Great Plain  0,495  0,497  0,992  2,851  3,843 
South Great Plain  0,463  0,559  1,022  2,931  3,953 
* - countries as economic units         
           
Table 1.b  The economic potential** of Hungarian regions, 2001    
           
   Inner potential  National potential  National potential  Outer potential  Potential 
Regions  Gi/dii   from outer regions  sum.  from foreign countries  overall 
Central Hungary  3,414  0,521  3,935  4,834  8,769 
Central Transdanubia  0,630  1,168  1,798  5,086  6,884 
West Transdanubia  0,624  0,723  1,347  5,846  7,193 
South Transdanubia  0,402  0,530  0,932  4,507  5,439 
North Hungary  0,468  0,584  1,052  4,375  5,427 
North Great Plain  0,495  0,497  0,992  4,111  5,103 
South Great Plain  0,463  0,559  1,022  4,258  5,280 
** - EU15 as one economic unit without inner borders       
 
In  this  model,  all  the  member  states  of  the  European  Union  (except  for  Luxembourg) 
materially influenced the development possibilities of the Hungarian economy. The size of 
impulses  received  from  remote  countries  like  Ireland  and  Portugal  was  identical  to  that 
transmitted by Bulgaria and neighbouring Slovenia. The countries that exert the strongest 
impact on the individual regions are nearly the same. The first five always include Germany, 
Italy, France and the UK, the four key economies of the EU, in the same order in terms of 
distance.  As  well  as  these  countries,  Austria  (due  to  its  proximity)  or  Russia  (due  to  its 
economic weight) is usually also included in the first six. The only exception to it is Western 
Transdanubia, in which case the sixth country is neighbouring Slovakia, with Russia coming 
seventh. Western and Central Transdanubia are also special in the sense that the impact of the 
Austrian economy on local economies is much stronger than could be expected based on its 
size. In the case of the former region Austria comes second after Germany, in the latter it 
comes third and has rather a high value. In this model variant, except for the above, local 
characteristics  (nearby  capital  cities  and  cross-border  relations)  influence  the  economic 
potential of the Hungarian regions only to a moderate degree. (Table 2.) 
Again, comparing potential values paints a picture of the development possibilities of the 
individual regions relative to the metropolitan one. The involvement of external economic 
centres further reduced the differences between the regions. The rise in the potential of the 
four disadvantaged regions in the Hungarian spatial structure was over two-fold (in Southern 
Transdanubia  nearly  three-fold).  Thus,  measured  against  the  metropolitan  region,  their 
convergence value reached 58%–62%. Mainly due to the proximity of Italy and the broader 
Mediterranean  region,  Southern  Transdanubia  had  the  highest  value.  The  Northern  Great 
Plain again brought up the rear, since only few supplementary development impulses reached 
it from the Eastern economies of the Continent. The two success regions in the provinces also 
changed  places.  Lying  further  west,  West  Transdanubia,  its  potential  having  more  than doubled, accounted for 82% of the capital city’s, while the corresponding figure for Central 
Transdanubia, at a more moderate growth rate, was over 78%. In this model the country has a 
clear tripartite structure: the capital city takes the lead in development, followed by Western 
and Central Transdanubia, constituting a relatively homogeneous space. Those spaces that 
are perceived as peripheral on the national scale and, viewed from outside, look like a single 
cluster come last. This scheme of spatial distribution is a relatively accurate approximation of 
spatial inequalities in Hungary both at a regional level and in other economic and social 
dimensions, even though the extent of the differences may be quite significant
16. 
 
In the second model variant, where EU member states are treated as national economies, both 
the internal and home potential of the Hungarian regions gave higher proportion in overall 
potential.  In the case  of the capital city  internal  potential alone amounted to 47% of the 
calculated total potential, while home potential stood at 54%. As regards the remainder of the 
countryside, inner potential was 10%-13% and home potential was mostly 23%-26% (with the 
exception of Central Transdanubia with high home potential, where it stood at 33.5%). In the 
light of this, it is safe to assume that, in the vast majority of the regions, two-thirds or even 
three  quarters  of  development  impulses  arrive  from  economic  actors  outside  the  country. 
Therefore, according high priority to a network of external market relations is of fundamental 
importance in both economic and regional policy. (Table 1.) 
One of the characteristics of the model is that not all economies reach the threshold level set 
by it even in West Europe. Besides Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal are also excluded from 
the countries that exert a material impact on Hungarian regions. The impact of Scandinavian 
countries  is  identical  to  that  of  Bulgaria  and  Slovenia.  As  borders  act  as  filters,  spatial 
proximity gains in importance in the Western hemisphere of the Continent as well. Thus there 
was a change in the order of strength of the individual national economies. One conspicuous 
phenomenon  is  that  neighbouring  countries  –  Austria  in  particular,  but  also  the  Czech 
Republic and even more significantly Poland – rose in importance
17. Another is Russia’s high 
ranking  (depending  on  the  region,  it  ranks  from  3rd  to  6th),  which  makes  its  possible 
influence on the Hungarian economy comparable to that of France. In this model cross-border 
relationships play more important roles, while the weight of an increasingly unified Western 
Europe is quite less. (Table 2.) 
Although the relative potential of the Hungarian regions (using the metropolitan one as a 
benchmark) increase spectacularly relative to home potential, its values remain below the 
level calculated in the first model. In the lagging regions the value rises approximately two-
fold  (the  most  rapidly  in  South  Transdanubia),  amounting  to  52%-56%  of  Budapest’s
18. 
Expressed in scores, the difference between the Northern Great Plain – which brings up the 
rear – and the somewhat more advantageous Northern Hungary is only 3. In the case of the 
two Transdanubian regions that take the lead in economic restructuring, the direction of the 
process is identical to what was described in connection with the first model, with its extent 
being  somewhat  more  modest.
19  The  country’s  fundamental  spatial  structure  remains 
unchanged,  however.  Only  the  metropolitan  region  stands  out  from  the  regions  more 
markedly and clearly. 
                                                  
16  GDP  per  capita  expressed  in  PPS  amounted to  83%  of  EU average  in the  metropolitan region in  2001; 
corresponding figures for the two most developed Transdanubian regions and the four lagging ones were 54%-
57% and 33%-39%, respectively. Regional purchase power was 107% of the national average in the central 
region, 92%-95% in the lagging ones and around the national average in regions undergoing re-industrialisation. 
17 Based on the scores, its impact is comparable with that of the UK. 
18 Relative to the first model, the extent of the decrease in potential is 6%-7%, i.e. the nation state model almost 
automatically reduces the value of the country’s less developed peripheral regions. 
19 Western Transdanubia is below the 77% level, while Central Transdanubia is below 73.5%, which is 5%-6% 
lower than in the first model variant.  
Table 2.a  The influence of most important economic partners* of Hungarian (NUTS 2) regions, 
2001           
Regions  Central Hungary  Central Transdanubia  West Transdanubia  South Transdanubia  North Hungary  North Great Plain  South Great Plain 
Countries  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point 
Germany  1  772  1  800  2  888  1  678  1  744  1  604  1  639 
Austria  2  421  2  507  1  920  3  295  4  244  4  219  3  252 
Italy  3  367  3  386  3  376  2  405  2  321  2  311  2  348 
Russia  4  241  5  231  6  226  5  218  3  267  3  267  4  236 
France  5  237  4  244  5  259  4  228  5  211  5  206  5  213 
Great Britain  6  169  7  174  7  183  6  163  7  153  7  149  6  154 
Poland  7  168  8  153  8  156  7  131  6  199  6  175  7  135 
Slovakia  8  150  6  183  4  373  8  99  9  90  8  133  {11}  {82} 
Ukraina  9  102  9  97  10  92  9  88  8  120  9  123  10  98 
Czech Rep.  10  89  10  97  9  117                        
Rumania  {11}  {80}                   10  86  10  99  9  98 
Croatia                    10  82                  
Srbia-Crna Gora                                      8  104 
* - countries as economic units                         
                            
Table 2.b  The influence of most important economic partners** of Hungarian (NUTS 2) regions, 2001           
Regions  Central Hungary  Central Transdanubia  West Transdanubia  South Transdanubia  North Hungary  North Great Plain  South Great Plain 
Countries  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point  Rank  Point 
Germany  1  1142  1  1200  1  1332  1  1017  1  1115  1  906  1  959 
Italy  2  551  2  579  3  564  2  607  2  481  2  466  2  522 
France  3  474  4  487  4  518  3  455  3  422  3  411  3  426 
Great Britain  4  423  5  434  5  457  4  408  4  382  4  373  4  384 
Austria  5  421  3  507  2  920  5  295  6  244  6  219  5  252 
Russia  6  241  6  231  7  226  6  218  5  267  5  267  6  236 
Poland  7  168  10  153  9  156  9  131  7  199  7  175  8  135 
Spain  8  153  8  157  10  152  7  160  8  143  8  141  7  149 
Netherland  9  150  9  155  8  165  8  144  9  133  10  130  9  135 
Slovakia  10  150  7  183  6  373  10  99  11  90  9  133  14  82 
Ukraina  11  102  12  97  13  92  12  87  10  120  11  123  12  98 
Belgium  12  93  13  96  12  111  11  89  13  82       13  83 
Czech Rep.  13  89  11  97  11  117                        
Rumania  14  80                   12  86  12  99  11  98 
Croatia                    13  82                  
Srbia-Crna Gora                                      10  104 
** - EU15 as an economic unit without inner borders                      
Conclusions 
Ash Amin (1976) relied on the uneven distribution of power in formulating his theory 
on the centre–periphery relationship. Core regions concentrate economic power and control 
technological  advance  and  production  through  an  unequal  exchange.  Moveable  goods, 
resources and the value added created during production flow from peripheries to centres in 
order  to  support  the  further  development  of  the  latter.  The  autonomous  development  of 
peripheries  (i.e.  development  independent  of  centres)  becomes  increasingly  difficult,  as 
centres devise decision-making mechanisms that suit their own interests
20. 
Storper and Walker (1989) argue that the main shaper of regional differences is the 
spatial expansion of production, i.e. the selection of global premises, which, by the 1980s, had 
become a more important cause of uneven spatial development than trade (unequal exchange). 
Krugman (1991) adds that an aggressive sectoral and regional policy and new background 
conditions (i.e. new economic paradigm) may provide for the possibility that new regional 
units  may  rise  to  a  higher  position  and  that  the  current  spatial  structure  of  geographic 
concentration may be overhauled. The essence of Krugman’s conclusion is that mobile capital 
must be offered outstandingly favourable conditions for investment, ensuring the possibility 
of earning high returns
21.  
In reality, only dominant societies can develop organically through the exploitation of 
their internal resources on a close to optimal level. Dependent societies can only grow as a 
proportion of the needs of dominant actors, which they, in a sense, reflect. The example of 
emerging markets suggests that their spectacular development, which can be attributed to the 
establishment and operation of market economy, is highly dependent on the control of global 
and supranational organisations (especially global financial markets). There are serious social 
risks inherent in this development path, since an asymmetric system of relations can easily 
dismantle  the  social  structure  of  a  dependent  country,  while  the  latter  only  scratches  the 
surface of the system which operates a dominant society.  
Subsidiaries  of  multinational  companies,  which  have  become  key  actors  in  local 
economies,  and  local  suppliers  and  subcontractors  which  do  business  with  them  are 
cogwheels in the machinery of capital flows concentrated and controlled by external decision-
making centres. The reason why they are involved in global economic trends is to realize 
extra profit. Local decision-makers’ room for manoeuvre, controlled by a network of national 
and international regulatory systems and institutions, has become rather limited. Nevertheless, 
the development of centres depends on whether or not there is an under-developed periphery 
and on the persistence of spatial inequalities. Yet, this interdependence, no matter how one-
sided  it  is,  does  provide  some  space  for  local  initiatives,  actions  and  development.  In 
consequence, genuine development, convergence with more developed regions and reduction 
in one-sided dependence may, nonetheless, materialise. Successful restructuring, which also 
presupposes  a  change  in  economic  policy,  may  easily  lead  to  higher  rungs  in  the  global 
ladder. 
The dependence of large urban regions on peripheries is stronger than it looks. This 
was  the  message  of  the  Brandt  Reports  (1980,  1983).  The  reason  for  this  is  that  while 
peripheries may decide to opt out of global trends and establish a relationship with centres 
that offer better development opportunities, thereby easing their dependence on core regions 
                                                  
20 Criticism has been voiced of the causal link according to which the social concentration of power entails the 
evolvement of the role of a spatial hub.  
21 Although the deconcentration of production and the decentralisation of certain components of decision-making 
could reshape the global economic landscape, if control over the key components of the production chain is 
retained, no fundamental change occurs in global economy. and expanding their leeway, opting out of global trends as an alternative is out of the question 
for metropolises with a central role. If their peripheries shrink, their supply position available 
for mobile capital deteriorates, which feeds into a decline in the volume of investments and 
competitiveness.  
The  supply  of  traditional  economic  resources  alone  can  no  longer  attract  mobile 
capital.  The  high-quality  provision  of  the  widest  possible  range  of  external  conditions  is 
becoming increasingly important at least with respect to target activities. This leads to the 
evolvement of specialised local and  regional economies  which are concentrated in  space. 
Underdevelopment  on  a  regional  level  is,  usually,  associated  with  unbalanced  spatial 
structures. For regional units, the token of their own development is good working conditions 
maintained with remote centres rather than co-operation with neighbouring regions or seeking 
joint solutions to problems
22. 
Marxist geographical approaches (Harvey, 1982 and Smith, 1984) speak of the uneven 
distribution of power, which involves spatial inequalities, be they direct or indirect control, 
the organisation and reorganisation of space through established networks or the utilisation of 
technological and innovational advantages. They identify ownership, or rather the unequal 
ownership of the means of production, as the cause of unevenly distributed power. Actors 
with the greatest power organise space and processes in it and channel profits to themselves, 
which  generate  class  divisions  manifesting  themselves  in  social,  economic  and  political 
conflicts. A privileged minority uses even public officials to reach their goals, while letting 
them have some of the profit
23. 
Uneven spatial development heavily exploits temporal and structural differences in the 
level of development of the individual regions. Today Europe’s most advanced urban regions 
mostly follow a post-industrial path of development. Those regions whose convergence was 
spectacular in the 1980s (e.g. Southern Germany, Southern France, Catalonia, the Third Italy) 
owed their dynamic development to industrial production based on post-Fordian principles 
and  flexible  specialisation.  The  implementation  of  the  new  production  model  was 
accompanied  by  vigorous  economic  restructuring,  with  new,  often  ‘imported’  sectors 
becoming  the  engines  of  local/regional  economic  growth.  This  upswing  can  only  be 
temporary, since – apart from activities that are cutting edge even in global comparison – 
competitors offering cheaper wages possess comparative advantages today. As Neil Smith 
(1984) put it, in the movement of capital oscillation can be detected between underdeveloped 
regions, which does not transform existing power relations fundamentally. 
The  evolvement  of  centres  and  peripheries  in  the  Hungarian  economy  is  not 
independent of the above global processes. While government policies accord high priority to 
Hungary’s soonest possible convergence with leading economies in Europe, a large part of the 
country is unable to follow the pace of development set by the capital city and a significant 
part is falling behind EU average. Although a large group of relevant regional theories set 
great store by government policies, Hungarian regulatory and control policy is dominated by 
(outdated) beliefs in the omnipotence of the market. Except for ad hoc measures aimed at 
managing crisis situations, no complex spatial policy is in place on a government level. It is 
true that neither parliamentary, nor extra-parliamentary forces have as yet put forward an 
effective strategy that could be interpreted as a response to the challenges posed by this area. 
                                                  
22 The model worked out by Slater (1975) for developing countries can be applied to spatial processes and the 
regional practice of communication in Hungary. 
23 This does not mean bribing directly government officials. In return for the passing and implementation of 
decisions in favour of capital, the possibility of access to information and participation in decision-making are 
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